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Abstract:  This paper aims to compare the labour market effects of two 
alternative retirement income polices: the superannuation guarantee; and the 
higher income taxes that would be required to fund the greater pension 
expenditure that would be incurred if the superannuation guarantee was 
removed. The labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee have 
already been modelled by Freebairn (1998) by undertaking comparative static 
analysis of a partial equilibrium model. A similar approach is used to examine 
the labour market effects of higher taxes. The paper sets out both theoretical 
models, and then considers a numerical example to compare the policy 
alternatives. It is concluded that the superannuation guarantee is less 
distortional than an “equivalent” tax increase as long as workers do not 
completely discount the future value of future income derived from 
compulsory superannuation contributions. 
 





The effects of compulsory superannuation on labour markets have been 
established by Freebairn (1998). Using a partial equilibrium model, he demonstrated 
that the long run labour market impact of the Government’s compulsory 
superannuation levy was reductions in wages, effective wages (defined as wages and 
superannuation benefits) and employment. A limitation of this approach is that 
removal of the superannuation guarantee would not undo the labour market effects 
identified by Freebairn, because such an abolition would result in increased pension 
payments. The increase in taxes required to fund these pension payments would then 
distort the labour market. From a labour market policy perspective, the central issue is 
whether the adverse effects resulting from the superannuation guarantee are greater or 
less than the effects of increased taxes that would result from the abolition of the 
superannuation guarantee.  
This study compares Freebairn’s findings on the labour market effects of the 
superannuation guarantee with the labour market effects of increased taxation 
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resulting from the removal of the guarantee. Section 2 outlines the Freebairn model. 
Section 3 outlines a model of the labour market consequences of increasing income 
taxes on the current working generation to fund increased pension payments. Section 
4 contains a numeric illustration that facilitates ready comparison of the labour market 
effects of the superannuation guarantee and taxation in the absence of the guarantee. It 
is concluded, in section 5, that the superannuation guarantee is less distortional than 
tax increases, as long as workers do not completely discount the future value of 
superannuation income derived from current compulsory contributions. 
 
 
2. The Freebairn Model: Labour Market Effects of Compulsory Superannuation 
 
When the Superannuation Guarantee was first introduced in Australia, it was 
the intention of Parliament that it would not affect employment: “There will be no 
increase in unemployment as a result of this legislation” (ACCI, 2003, p.14-5, citing 
Senator Sherry, on the Superannuation Guarantee Act 1992). However, 
superannuation does have a distortional impact, as it is a labour on-cost for 
employers, whilst for employees it is a form of future income (Freebairn, 2004, 
p.191). 
Freebairn (1998) models the resulting distortions as a net tax on the labour 
market.   He considers a demand and supply model of the labour market, using a 
comparative static approach to determine the effects of the superannuation guarantee. 
He considers both a flexible and rigid wage model, and examines three situations, 
where the employer, the employee or the Government pays the contribution. The 
situation in which the employer pays is most appropriate to Australia. This paper only 
considers the long run, flexible case, as this is the most relevant from a policy 
perspective.  The formal specification is shown in Appendix A. 
When the employer is responsible for the contributions, superannuation is a 
direct addition to labour costs, and thus the demand curve shifts down by the amount 
of the levy (Freebairn, 1998, p.61). As the superannuation payment is an additional 
benefit to workers, the labour supply curve also shifts down, by the present value of 
superannuation contributions (labelled R(S)
2) (Freebairn, 1998, p.61). This is shown 
in Figure 1. Due to compulsion, liquidity constraints, and interactions with eligibility 
for the age pension, the employees’ valuation of the contribution may be less than the 
levy itself (Freebairn, 2004, p.194). In this situation the labour supply curve will fall 
by less than the demand curve (Freebairn, 2004, p.194)  
In the flexible wage situation shown in Figure 1, the introduction of the 
superannuation guarantee results in both a drop in wages, from W to W1, and a fall in 
employment, from E to E1. Employer labour costs increase from W to C, which is less 
than the full cost of the levy. Effective employee income (the market wage plus the 
present value of the superannuation levy) falls from W to Y (Freebairn, 1998, p.67). 
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3. Labour Market Effects of Increased Taxation Following the Abolition of 
Compulsory Superannuation  
 
Freebairn’s analysis is confined to the current labour market effects of the 
superannuation guarantee. The intergenerational transfer of resources from the 
working generation to the retired generation through the fiscal system is implicitly 
assumed to be constant. However, one policy relevant feature of an ageing population 
is that the intergenerational fiscal transfer increases with time. The superannuation 
guarantee is, to some extent, the policy instrument designed to reduce such (ongoing 
and increasing) transfers. Consequently, the insight of Freebairn’s model can be 
usefully complemented by a comparative static analysis of an alternative policy 
regime where there is no superannuation guarantee, but higher taxes to fund the 
higher cost of pensions because of the aging population. 
In carrying out this exercise, two issues need to be considered. First, as ageing 
is a “once only phenomenon” (McDonald & Kippen, 1999, p.54), to calculate the 
appropriate tax increase we need to consider when the population and the economy 
will reach their new equilibria. This is clearly dependent on the mortality assumptions 
used. Under the ABS assumption that life expectations at birth will increase by 10 
years over the next century, the majority of adjustments to the population structure 
should be completed by around 2040 (McDonald & Kippen, 1999, p.54). This 
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Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), and hence is best for the purposes of this 
analysis.   
Second, we should consider only the social expenditures that will be avoided 
by the creation of the superannuation guarantee – that is, expenditure on pensions. It 
is appropriate to put aside the changes in expenditure on health and aged care, as well 
as those on all social security payments except the age pension, as they will occur 
regardless of whether the superannuation guarantee is in place or not. It should also be 
recognised that the superannuation guarantee would not remove all increases in age 
pension expenditure. Expenditure on the age pension is still predicted to increase from 
2.9% of GDP in 2001-02 to 4.6% of GDP by 2041-42 (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002, p.44).   
 
Superannuation was first introduced in 1986 as award superannuation. In 1985 
1,334,300 people, or 67.2% of people of pension age, received the age pension 
(Winter, 2000). In the same year expenditure on the pension was 2.7% of GDP 
(Whiteford & Bond, 1999, p.188). In order to estimate age pension expenditure in 
2041-42 in a situation without the superannuation guarantee, it is assumed that both 
the pension rate (an individual pension as a share of GDP) and the share of the aged 
population receiving the pension would remain constant, at their 1985 levels. It is 
estimated that there will be 6.2 million people over 65 in Australia by 2041-42 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.22). Under the above assumptions, without the 
superannuation guarantee roughly 4,166,400 people would receive the pension. Age 
pension expenditure in 2041-42 would therefore be expected to reach 8.43% of GDP, 
3.83% of GDP above that predicted by The Intergenerational Report. It is this amount 
that needs to be considered in a comparison with the superannuation guarantee. 
In order to cover this increase in pension expenditure, Commonwealth revenue would 
need to rise by 3.83% of GDP. In 2001-02, revenue from income taxation was 11.23% 
of GDP (ABS, 2004). Assuming the entire fiscal adjustment was to come from an 
increase in income taxes, tax revenue would need to rise to 15.06% of GDP by 2041-
42, an increase of 34.10%. This would bring the average tax rate of 23.43% in 2001-
02 up to 31.42%
3.  
To illustrate the effects of this increase on taxes on the labour market, a 
demand and supply model similar to that in Freebairn (1998) can be used, which has 
been formally specified in Appendix B1.  The outcome can be seen in Figure 2. 
Because it had been assumed that the entire tax increase would come from personal 
income tax, the labour demand curve is unaffected. However, the labour supply curve 
shifts up by the amount of the additional tax. As a result, wages increase to W1 and 
employment falls to E1. Effective employee income falls to Y. 
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Figure 2: Increase in Income Taxes 
 
 
4. Numeric Illustration of Labour Market Effects for the two options 
 
The previous sections lay the theoretical framework to analyse the effects of 
both the superannuation guarantee, and an “equivalent” tax increase, on the labour 
market. The purpose of this section of the paper is to carry out a quantitative analysis 
to allow a comparison of these policy alternatives. 
In his paper, Freebairn (1998) constructs a numerical example of the labour 
market effects of the superannuation guarantee using the demand and supply model 
discussed in Section 2. The formulae used by Freebairn for this example are available 
in appendix B.2. He assumes labour demand has an elasticity of -0.7, and labour 
supply has an elasticity of 0.2 (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). The more elastic either curve, 
the greater the fall in employment resulting from the superannuation guarantee 
(Freebairn, 1998, p.64). He considers four situations, in which the present value of the 
superannuation contributions to the employee are 0%, 33%, 67% or 100% of the levy. 
A valuation of 100% means compulsory superannuation is a perfect substitute for 
wages, whilst a valuation of 0% implies superannuation has no present value 
(Freebairn, 1998, p.64). The results for each valuation are shown in Table 1
4.  
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Table 1: Labour Market Effects of 9% Employer Contributions  
Present value of 
superannuation 
as a percentage 






0 -7.0 2.0 -7.0 -1.4
33 -7.7 1.3 -4.7 -0.9
67 -8.3 0.7 -2.3 -0.5





The effects of the superannuation guarantee on the labour market depend 
largely on how employees value the superannuation payment (Freebairn 1998 & 
2004). In the situation where compulsory superannuation is a perfect substitute for 
wages, the labour supply curve shifts down by the same amount as the demand curve. 
As a result wages fall by 9%, but employment, effective employee income and 
employer labour costs are not affected (Freebairn, 2004, p.193). Alternatively, when, 
as expected, employees value superannuation at less than 100% of the levy, the 
distortions to the labour market are more obvious. As demand is more elastic than 
supply, the cost of these distortions is bourn mainly by the employee (Freebairn, 
2004, p.194). 
Similarly, the demand and supply model set out in section 3 has been used to 
estimate the labour market impact of an increase in taxes. An increase in taxes by the 
amount estimated in section 3 will lead to wages increasing by approximately 1.78% 
and employment dropping by 1.24%. Effective employee income
5 falls by roughly 
6.20%. The formulae used to calculate these changes are available in Appendix B.1. 
The effects of the superannuation guarantee and the “equivalent” increase in 
taxes are compared in Table 2. Whilst the superannuation guarantee and the tax 
change have opposing effects on the market wage, their effect on both employment 
and effective employee income is in the same direction
6. The distortional effect on 
employment from the tax change is between that from the superannuation guarantee 
when its present value is between 0% and 33%. 
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also reduce effective employee income (when the present value of the levy is less than 100%) because 
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income fall, because the increase in the market wage is less than the cost of the additional taxes. 
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Table 2: Labour Market Distortions from Superannuation vs a Tax Change 
Percentage 
Change
in: 100 67 50 33 0
Employment 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4 -1.24
Market Wage -9.0 -8.3 -8.0 -7.7 -7.0 1.78
Effective Income 0.0 -2.3 -3.5 -4.7 -7.0 -6.20
No 
Superannuation Percentage Present Value of the Levy




Freebairn (1998, p.60) argues that for those on high incomes with large 
voluntary private savings, compulsory superannuation is non-binding, as they are able 
to substitute some of their private savings for the compulsory superannuation 
payments. For these people the present value of the superannuation levy is close to 
100% (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). On the other hand, for those with low incomes or 
broken careers, the present value of the levy is likely to be closer to 0% (Freebairn, 
1998, p.64). These people are likely to find the lack of liquidity of superannuation 
constraining, and may lose part of the means-tested age pension due to their 
superannuation savings (Freebairn, 1998, p.60). Guest and McDonald (2002, p.30) 
assume that the average present value of superannuation is 50% of the levy. Whilst 
this is not an empirical estimate, they argue that it seems to be a “ball-park” figure 
(Guest & McDonald, 2002, p.30). 
The are two obvious policy options for dealing with increased pressure from 
growing intergenerational fiscal transfers resulting from the aging of the population: 
maintain the current superannuation guarantee; or abolish the superannuation 
guarantee and increase taxes to fund future pension increases. If the present value of 
compulsory superannuation payments to the employee is as low as 33% of the levy, it 
appears that the superannuation guarantee has a less distortional effect on 
employment than increasing taxes. Therefore, from a labour market perspective, the 
decision to introduce the superannuation guarantee appears to have been appropriate. 
However, this comparison only applies in the new equilibrium that applies 
from 2041-42. It does not consider the transitional period before this equilibrium is 
reached. The increase in taxes would occur gradually over this period, and as such, at 
the start of the transition, the distortional effect of the tax change would be less than 
that from the superannuation guarantee. However, as the taxes continued to rise over 
the period, their distortional impact would become more significant. A discounted 
analysis is not considered in this paper because, among other things, information on 
the elasticities of labour supply and demand for different wages and labour quantities 
is not available. 
 
 
5. Conclusion, Policy Considerations & Further Research 
 
Freebairn (1998) demonstrates the distortional impact of the superannuation guarantee 
on the labour market. However, as shown in this study, these labour market 
distortions need to be compared to the longer-term distortions in the absence of the 
superannuation guarantee. That is, the labour market effects of the superannuation 
guarantee should be compared to those from an “equivalent” change in taxes that 
would be required to cover the extra expenditure on the age pension, had the   8
superannuation guarantee not been introduced. Although the result does depend on 
what valuation employees place on their superannuation payments, it is clear that 
superannuation will generally have a less distortional effect on employment than the 
alternative of an “equivalent” tax increase. Therefore from a labour market 
perspective, it is provisionally concluded that the decision to introduce the 
superannuation guarantee should be maintained as government policy. 
However, in fully evaluating the suitability of a policy, other issues must also 
be considered. When evaluating the retirement income system, one of those issues is 
the impact of the system on the savings rates. There is still some debate in the 
literature regarding the impact of the superannuation guarantee on household savings. 





Appendix A: Full Specification of Freebairn’s Partial Equilibrium Model 
 
In considering the compulsory superannuation guarantee as a tax, Freebairn 
(1998) defines the after-tax values of wages used for current consumption, the after-
tax value of wages used for saving and the after-tax value of superannuation. His full 
specifications are as follows
7: 
 
i) the after tax value of wages used for current consumption: 
 
R(W,C) = W(1 - ty) 
 
ii) the after tax value of wages used for saving and then spent for pre-retirement 
purposes: 
 




iii) the after tax present value of voluntary and compulsory superannuation: 
 
R(S) = W(1 – te)(1 + r(1 - 0.15))




                 W = wages allocated to either consumption, saving or superannuation 
ty  = income tax rate 
r  = pre-tax return on savings 
ti  = effective tax rate on savings 
d  = time preference rate     
m = number of saving periods 
te  = tax rate on funds entering superannuation 
tx  = tax rate on fund withdrawals 
tr  = effective tax rate associated with withdrawal of aged pension benefits 
n  = number of periods to retirement 
             0.15  = the flat 15% tax rate on fund earnings 
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Appendix B: Formulae and Calculations 
 
B.1 Labour Market Effects of a Tax Change to Fund Increased Pensions 
The formulae used to calculate the labour market effects of the tax change that 
may be necessary had the superannuation guarantee not been introduced are similar to 
those used above. The required increase in taxes necessary to cover the reduction in 
pension expenditure from the superannuation guarantee is 34.10%, as calculated in 
section 3.4.2. The elasticity values used were 0.2 for labour supply and –0.7 for 
labour demand, as in Freebairn (1998). 
 
Before the tax change: 
Employer labour demand:   Q  = a – bW 
Employee labour supply:   Q  = c + d(W-T) 
Where: 
   T = the original tax paid 
  t = the original tax rate (23.43%) 
  
After the tax change: 
Employer labour demand:   Q  = a – bW 
Employee labour supply:   Q  = c + d(W- 1.341T) 
 
Using these formulas, the change in wages due to the tax change is: 
 
  (W’ – W) = 0.341dt/(b + d) 
 
and the change in employment is: 
 
  (Q’ – Q) = -0.341bdt/(b + d) 
 
B.2 Labour Market Effects of the Superannuation Guarantee 
The effects of the 9% employer superannuation contribution on employment and 
wages were calculated by Freebairn using the following formulae.
8 
 
Employer labour demand:   Q = a – bC 
Employee labour supply:   Q  = c + dR 
 
 Where: 
  C  = cost of labour to the employer  
  R = effective return to the employee 
  b  = absolute value of elasticity of labour demand  
  d  = elasticity of labour supply.  
  W  = wages 
  L = the superannuation levy  
  g = the value employees put on future income  
      provided by superannuation (0, 0.33 etc) 
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Without superannuation:  C = W 
 R  =  W 
 
Therefore:   W = (a - c)/(b + d) 
 
When superannuation is introduced: 
  C = W + L 
  R = W + gL 
 
Therefore:  W’ = (a - c)/(b + d) – ((b + dg)L)/(b + d) 
 
The change in wages is due to the introduction of the superannuation guarantee is:  
 
  (W’ – W) = -((b + dg)L)/(b + d)  
 
The change in employment can be calculated using the same formulae: 
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